Review: The Great Partnership: Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and the Fate of the Confederacy, by Christian Keller

To read an interview with author Christian Keller, click here.

Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson are perhaps two of the most iconic Confederate figures and their relationship has been extolled and studied from the Civil War years to the present. Culminating in the resounding victory at Chancellorsville, after which Jackson lost his life, the partnership between Jackson and Lee has become stuff of legend and myth, as well as historical significance. These two officers have also become solidly entrenched in the Lost Cause mythology where both men have been idolized and Jackson’s death mourned as a death knell for the Confederacy.  In the years after the war, and continuing to today, people have asked what would have been different if Jackson had been with Lee at Gettysburg. Would the outcome of the battle have been different, and thus would the South have had a better chance of winning the war? In The Great Partnership Christian Keller examines the relationship between Lee and Jackson during the military campaigns of 1862 and 1863, the contemporary reaction to Jackson’s death, and how Jackson’s absence affected Lee and the rest of the army during the Gettysburg campaign. Keller analyzes Lee and Jackson through the lens of command and leadership and carefully examines the historical record to pull the historical narrative out of the myth that has grown around these two men.

Keller closely analyzes how the partnership between Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson solidified between the Seven Days battles and Chancellorsville. While he goes into great military detail in some parts of this chronology, this is in no way a comprehensive military history of Jackson’s Civil War career. Keller focuses on the battles, strategies, and meetings that knit Lee and Jackson into a friendship both on and off the battlefield. Keller shows how Lee began to utilize and rely on Jackson’s ideas and his ability to move troops effectively in battle. Keller also argues that a mutual Christian faith strengthened the bond between the generals, particularly during the winter encampment of 1862-1863 at Fredericksburg, VA. During this time, General James Longstreet was sent further south and in his absence the relationship between Jackson and Lee grew. Keller even suggests that during this time, and up to Jackson’s death, Longstreet took a lower position in Lee’s esteem compared to Jackson and even worked against some of Lee’s strategies for the war with politicians in Richmond. The height of the Lee-Jackson partnership was the Battle of Chancellorsville where Lee’s army won a resounding victory, highlighted by Jackson’s infamous flank march against the Union XI Corps. This was the high-point of the Lee-Jackson relationship, but it also marked the end of that partnership. Jackson was hit by friendly fire at the end of his successful flanking maneuver; while recovering from the resulting amputation of his left arm Jackson died from pneumonia about a week after the battle.

The last two chapters of the book analyzes the impact that Jackson’s death had on the Confederate cause. While the first chapters analyzed the causes and effects of this relationship between Lee and Jackson, this last section of the book is where Keller tries to untangle historical interpretation from Lost Cause mythology through an analysis of the primary sources. Keller opens chapter five (partially titled “The Partnership Broken”) by saying that the “reality of Jackson’s death struck like a thunderbolt into the heart of the Confederate psyche” (176). The idea that Jackson’s death was seen as a catastrophe for the Confederacy, causing defeat at Gettysburg and in the larger war, has largely been waved aside as part of the Lost Cause mythology. Keller argues that, while Jackson has been enshrined in this post-war memory, Southerners at the time did believe that Jackson’s death spelled disaster for their cause. Throughout the chapter Keller shows how officers and soldiers in the army reacted to the news, but also how people on the homefront confronted the reality of Jackson’s demise. Even in 1863, as the news spread through the South Confederates lamented the impact that his death would have on their cause, for both strategy and morale. Keller continues this analysis into the final chapter of the book which examines the Gettysburg campaign and the possible strategic consequences of the broken partnership between Lee and Jackson. Lee moved forward with the plans he had been making with Jackson, an invasion into the northern states, but he had to adapt to a new command structure. New leadership along with the absence of Stuart’s cavalry in the early stages of the campaign have been pointed to as reasons for Lee’s loss at Gettysburg. Keller has to navigate a fine line here, between analyzing what happened and surmising what could have been different if Jackson had not died. He examines the command structure and strategies employed in the battle and is careful to make it clear that Jackson’s death did not make defeat inevitable, but did put certain events into motion that had a significant effect on the battle. Key moments, such as the decision to stop pushing the Union retreat on the first day of the battle affected the outcome of the battle, but Keller argues that they did not seal the fate of the Confederates. Other decisions on days two and three ultimately caused the South to lose at Gettysburg. Keller also claims that Jackson’s death may have taken a mental toll on men like Lee and Stuart who were mourning the loss of their dear friend, which may have accounted for some of the decisions made. He does not explicitly state it, but he is touching on the mental toll that warfare has on the people who fight it; the loss of Jackson may have personally affected the officers close to him in a way that affected their ability to implement strategy and fight in the next big engagement of the war.

In his analysis of Jackson and Lee through a strategic and command lens, Keller summed up his argument as such:

The death of Stonewall Jackson was a strategic blow to the Confederacy, an inflection point in the war that by itself did not foreordain rebel defeat but certainly made the policy goal of Southern independence more difficult to attain. It prompted a series of second- and third-order effects, such as Lee’s reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia and the operational and tactical decision-making that ensued in the fateful Pennsylvania Campaign. The timing of Jackson’s loss was therefore paramount, especially in how it affected Lee personally and his command team’s efficacy at a strategic juncture in the war. (249)

With the theme of leadership and lessons for future leaders in mind, Keller includes an appendix with the key strengths of the Lee-Jackson partnership.

The strength of this book is a well-researched and well-written narrative that seamlessly combines military strategy and human lives together in a way that is compelling for both historians and general readers. The writing is not heavy or full of military jargon that might leave a reader bogged down, which makes the book enjoyable to read. The themes of command, strategy, and leadership come across strongly throughout the book and typically Keller is careful with his post-war sources to expose biases and Lost Cause rhetoric. This book would be perfect for a reader who is looking for a scholarly approach to the Lee-Jackson partnership, one who is trying to analyze Confederate leadership and military strategy, or even one who is looking for a good read about Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee. A critique of the book is that while Keller looks at Lee and Jackson through the particular lens of command and leadership, he does not make a radically new argument about these two men. Much of this history has been researched and written about before, and Keller is just highlighting certain aspects to analyze why this partnership grew so strong and how it affected military strategy in 1862 and 1863. For those who are well versed in the history of these campaigns and in the careers of these two men, much of this information will be familiar. I think the most compelling part of the analysis was the chapter in which Keller pulls away the Lost Cause rhetoric to show that Southerners at the time reacted in those ways to Jackson’s death. He also delves into the “what if” question that historians usually avoid. He does a pretty good job navigating that fine line in his chapter about Gettysburg, but chooses to close his book with an imagined vignette of “what did not happen,” where a one-armed Jackson rides with Lee and crosses the Mason-Dixon line on their way towards Harrisburg, PA (247-248). While it is a more compelling narrative, it would have been stronger to end on a more scholarly note instead of playing into fantasies that are usually held by Lost Causers.

Dr. Kathleen Logothetis Thompson earned her PhD in Nineteenth Century/Civil War America from West Virginia University, and also holds a M.A. from WVU and a B.A. from Siena College. Her research is on mental trauma and coping among Union soldiers and she is currently working on her first book, tentatively titled War on the Mind. She currently teaches history at several colleges and universities and leads tours of Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater. Kathleen was a seasonal interpreter at Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania National Military Park for several years and is the co-editor of Civil Discourse.